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Sophistic appearances1
Øyvind rabbås
The Sophist begins with the need to distinguish the philosopher from two 
other characters with whom he appears to be identical: the statesman and the 
sophist (216c). While the philosopher’s appearance becomes the topic of the 
Statesman, the sophist is the subject of the eponymous dialogue. After six 
failed attempts to define the essence of the sophist (221c–31b), the Eleatic 
Visitor and his interlocutor, young Theaetetus, reach an impasse (in ἀπορία) 
about what the sophist is (231b9–c2). They then decide to begin a new attempt 
(232b), starting from the observation that the sophist characteristically engages 
in controversies (ἀντιλέγειν), (b6; cf. 225a–6a, 231e1–2). In fact, he has the 
ability to engage in controversies about every subject, which makes him seem 
‘wiser than everyone else about everything’ (233b1–2; cf. 233c1–2, 233c6), 
without actually being so (233c8). By analogy with a painter, who makes 
pictorial representations, the sophist uses words (λόγοι): he makes ‘spoken 
images of everything’ (εἴδωλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων, 234c6) (cf. 240a1–2). 
But since he does so without having any real knowledge about these things, he 
is ‘a kind of cheat who imitates [or represents] real things’ (τῶν γοήτων ἐστί 
τις, μιμητὴς ὢν τῶν ὄντων, 235a1) and ‘makes our souls believe what is false’ 
(240d2–3).2 What can justify this harsh characterization?  
The starting-point is a distinction between the production of originals or the 
things themselves (τὰ αὐτά), and the production of images or representations 
(εἴδωλα), i.e. things that are similar to the originals (ὁμοιωμάτων τινῶν) 
(235d–36c). These representations are similar to the originals or, as I suggest 
here, they are appearances of them: they make the originals appear. But the 
category of representation is then subdivided into two species: likenesses 
(εἰκόνα) – their production is called εἰκαστικὴ τέχνη (235d6–36b3) and 
apparitions (φαντάσματα), which are produced by an εἰκαστικὴ τέχνη 
(236b4–c5). Since the sophist is defined as a species of apparition-maker, it is 
important to note the difference between these two kinds of representation, but 
unfortunately this is neither easy nor uncontroversial.3  
1 One of Øivind Andersen‘s main interests is rhetoric and its history, especially in Antiquity. The sophists 
are crucial in this history, and Plato’s dialogue devoted to this topic is therefore an appropriate subject for 
my contribution to this Festschrift.
2 Translations are from White 1993, sometimes emended.
3 I follow Notomi’s reading; see Notomi 1999, 147–55. The choice of ‘image’ for εἶδωλον and ‘apparition’ 
for φάντασμα is due to Notomi; White 1993 has ‘copy’ and ‘appearance’.
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Likenesses and apparitions are distinguished by two criteria: (1) their 
inherent correctness and (2) the viewpoint from which they are apprehended. 
A likeness is defined as correct if it keeps ‘to the proportions of length, breadth, 
and depth of the model, and also by keeping to the appropriate colours of its 
parts’ (235d7–e2). The likeness is correct because it represents the properties 
of the model as they are, independently of how they are seen by (or appear 
to) the addressee of the representation. An apparition, on the other hand, will 
distort the properties of the original; the example given is a large sculpture 
whose upper parts are in fact larger than that of their model. The reason for 
this intentional distortion is that in this way the sculpture will in fact better 
represent its model to the intended spectators, since they will see it from a 
low viewpoint. Thus the distortion is motivated by the desire to make the 
model appear the way it is. But, and this is the problem, while a likeness 
is in itself correct, an apparition is not – the latter depends on the spectator 
being appropriately situated (at a good viewpoint; cf. 236b4–5) for it to truly 
represent, and it is thus held hostage to his competence and understanding.4
To represent something is to make it appear, i.e. to make it apparent or 
(somehow) present. Something can be represented, i.e. made to appear to 
somebody, either by using pictures or by using ‘speeches’ (logoi): we have 
pictorial and logical representation. A pictorial representation will represent 
by being perceptually like the original being represented: a picture of my car 
looks like my car. But a logical representation does not represent in virtue 
of this kind of similarity: a proposition does not look like what it represents. 
(The proposition ‘Theaetetus sits’ does not look like the sitting Theaetetus, or 
Theaetetus’ sitting.) Nevertheless, we may say that the logical representation 
(the proposition) is structurally like what it represents in that its form, ‘a is F’, 
is somehow isomorphic to the property F’s inhering in the object a. The person 
asserting this proposition (the speaker) can see, i.e. understand or intellectually 
grasp, this isomorphism, and so can the addressee of this assertion. When the 
speaker produces his proposition, he aims to make the fact (F’s inhering in a, 
or a’s being F) apparent (intellectually visible) to the addressee, and he can do 
this only if the latter is able to understand it (‘see the point’). Moreover, he is 
able to do so in virtue of his mastery of the concept of F, and of representing 
to himself a’s falling under this concept. This kind of representation is not 
imagistic/pictorial, but it is a matter of seeing or grasping structural similarities 
nevertheless (the visual metaphors are neither arbitrary nor misleading here), 
and it is this common feature of grasping similarities that justifies treating 
pictorial and logical representation as two species of the same genus.
4 Cf. Notomi 1999, 149–50.
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Even with these distinctions in hand, however, there is unclarity about 
the sophist (236c9–d4), and the main reason for this is that all this talk 
of representation, likeness, and apparition raises deep problems about 
appearance, not being and being, and false speech (236d9–7a4). It is precisely 
these difficulties that a sophist would latch onto if he were presented with this 
argument (239c9–d5). These problems therefore occupy the interlocutors for 
a good 20 Stephanus pages (241b–64b), before they return to the account of 
the sophist as a maker of apparitions (264c–8e). But however important these 
topics may be in their own right, they are taken up in this dialogue because 
this is necessary in order to determine the nature of the sophist and meet his 
counterattack against the proposed definition of him as a maker of apparitions.
The problem is as follows. Any statement is saying something. A false 
statement is taken to be saying that which is not. But that which is not is 
nothing, i.e. not something. So a false statement seems to be saying nothing, 
i.e. not to be a statement at all, i.e. to be impossible. And if representations 
(images, likenesses, and apparitions) are false or illusory, they too will seem to 
be representing nothing, i.e. not be representations, i.e. be impossible.  
The solution to this puzzle is controversial, but I follow Michael Frede 
and assume the following.5 For the purpose of this discussion, we can take 
a statement to have the form ‘a is F’. Here ‘a’ denotes the subject of the 
statement (the object talked about), and ‘F’ (the predicate term) the property 
ascribed to the subject. If the statement is true, then F is ‘about [περί]’, or 
‘with reference to’, a – F is present in, or appears in, a – and this is what 
the statement says. This means that F’s presence/appearance in a is made 
apparent by the statement; the statement is a true appearance of an appearance. 
However, if the statement is false, then F is not about/with reference to a – F 
is not present in, it does not appear in, a – although this is what the statement 
says. Thus, the statement appears to be making the presence/appearance of 
F in a apparent, without actually doing so; the false statement is a ‘mere 
appearance’, i.e. a false appearance of an appearance.
How can this solve the problem of defining the sophist? The sophist, 
remember, was defined as a maker of ‘spoken images’ or ‘apparitions’, without 
a real knowledge of what he makes appear. However, when the interlocutors 
discuss the problem of false statement – or, rather, false logos – the examples 
they use are simple, individual propositions: ‘Theaetetus is sitting’ and 
‘Theaetetus is flying’. Thus the question is as follows: How can a philosophical 
analysis of these statements, and in particular of the latter, false statement, help 
us understand what we want to understand, namely what a sophist is?
5 Frede 1992, section III, esp. 417–23.
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The activity of the sophists is essentially tied to rhetoric, i.e. to public 
speaking in the assembly or court of law, or at special public events such as 
funerals. This context is what gives us the three rhetorical genres that Aristotle 
identifies in the Rhetoric (I 3). The sophists are either orators themselves or 
they write speeches for orators, as well as educating them and giving them 
advice. So their logoi are speeches, orations before an audience, and their 
purpose is to persuade the audience that their case is the right one, that their 
claim is true or justified. But if that is so, it seems that the problem with 
the sophist is not that he presents us with straightforward lies, i.e. individual 
propositions that he knows are false – that would be too risky as a rhetorical 
strategy. Rather, the problem is that he can speak falsely without uttering a 
single false proposition. The falsity of his activity is therefore a property of 
his speech (logos) as a whole, not of any individual proposition produced 
as part of this speech. However, this raises the following questions: What is 
the relation between such a logos, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
the logoi (statements) discussed in the digression on non-being and false 
statement? And how can an analysis of false statements help us understand 
the nature of untruthful or deceitful speeches?
Perhaps a place to start is with a very basic assumption about language or 
logos that seems to underlie the entire discussion, and, in fact, the origins of 
philosophy with the Greeks. On this assumption, the purpose of language – 
i.e. assertive speech, logos – is to make reality apparent to us, so that we can 
represent reality to each other by means of it. Thus, the function (task, ergon) 
of logos is practical: we want to tell (or show) each other (and ourselves) 
how things are so that we can conduct ourselves accordingly; and true logos 
represents reality as it is. This can be done in simple cases, in the form of 
individual propositions that are true or false, but it can also be done in complex 
cases such as when we describe a house, tell a story about what happened, 
summarize the contents of a book or a movie, explain what causes water to 
freeze, or argue why a certain course of action is better than the alternative 
because it is more prudent or just. All these cases are examples of logos, and 
they represent – or present themselves as representing – reality: the way things 
are. And they do so in order to affect us: to make us act in certain ways, to make 
us take up certain attitudes towards certain people, or to make us understand a 
certain part of reality. But the difference between these complex cases of logos 
and the simple cases exemplified in the dialogue is that the relation between 
the logos and the way things are, the relation of representation, is much more 
subtle in the complex cases than in the simple cases. A single statement or 
proposition is true or false, period, but a speech can be more, or less, adequate, 
truthful, objective, balanced, informative, reliable, trustworthy, etc.
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We may get a better handle on this point if we imagine that the sophists’ 
logos can be condensed, as it were, into a single proposition. What kind of 
proposition could this be?  Here are a few possibilities: (1) ‘We ought to sack 
Troy’; (2) ‘Those who fell at Marathon were heroes’; (3) ‘Raising the taxes 
is unjust’; (4) ‘Euaeon is guilty of murder’. These seem to be representative 
examples of statements that an orator might make in one of the Classical 
rhetorical contexts, and they can all be schematized in the same way as the 
examples used in the Sophist, in the form ‘a is F’. If so, even a rhetorical logos 
can be seen as a matter of subsuming an object under a concept, or of ascribing 
a property, conceptualized by the predicate-term, to the object. In the simple 
cases discussed in the Sophist, this ascription is a straightforward matter: 
Theaetetus is either sitting or he is not, and he is either flying or he is not; 
the concepts of sitting and flying are easy to apply. But in the rhetorical cases 
we imagined, the relevant concepts (‘ought to be sacked’, ‘hero’, ‘unjust’ (or 
‘just’), ‘murder’) are not so easily applied. A concept is a rule, containing 
criteria for its application to all cases belonging to a certain class. Sometimes, 
as in the case of sitting or flying, these criteria are more, or less, straightforward. 
But in other cases they are not, and then the concept can only be applied after 
a rather elaborate process involving the survey of a large amount of relevant 
information that must be interpreted before one can reach a balanced overall 
judgement. The conclusion may be stated in the simple form ‘a is F’, as in the 
examples given, but the statement expressing this conclusion may perhaps 
better be regarded as a condensed summary of the entire judgement, rather 
than as the judgement itself – it is the case in a nutshell, as it were.
So how can this line of reasoning justify the proposed account of the 
sophist as a maker of ‘apparitions’ or of ‘spoken images of everything’? The 
sophist’s logoi appear – are made by him to appear – to represent the way 
things are, in particular in ethical, legal, and political contexts. That is, we 
could say, they appear to be representing the way certain properties, picked 
out by our concepts (in particular ethical, legal, and political properties), are 
present in, or appear in, the cases he is discussing; but this appearance of 
representing this presence is false, deceptive. Thus, the sophist’s speech – (1) 
what he says – is deceptive: it merely appears to be true. But that also means 
that (2) what he does in presenting these speeches appears to be to speak truly; 
and that (3) what he is, insofar as he engages in this activity, appears to be 
wise.6 So the sophist’s deceptive appearance is threefold, and he is in every 
way an ‘apparition-maker’ and ‘a kind of cheat who imitates [or represents] 
real things’.
6 Cf. Notomi 1999, 120f, 134.
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